What Kind of God is Worth It? (part 4)

In part 3, I argued for the necessity of a plurality in unity due to the relational nature of God based upon the propositions that 1) God is good, and 2) God made human beings in His image. However, is it possible that God is not good? Or is it possible that human beings are not created in God's image? Today, I only want to touch on the first question.

Let us consider whether or not God is good. Human beings of all cultures have a sense of good and evil. How each is defined may vary, but we each have those categories consistently expressed. They are universal categories and can potentially be attributed to God. Is it proper to do so?

First, let us consider the difference between good and evil. Dualism is the belief that good and evil are polar opposites, two equal and opposite forces. We find this in ideas such as yin/yang (in which good and evil, like all other opposites, ebb and flow, neutralizing in a seeking of balance) or Manicheism (which saw the two in a pitched battle, hoping for yet never certain of good's eventual triumph). However, if they are equal opposites, what is to say which should be "winner," so to speak? Why do humans almost consistently affirm good over evil? If they are equal opposites, the very ideas of good and evil are left without moral force. They would be merely preferences--hardly any different than saying, "I prefer my coffee black," instead of "I'll take cream and sugar, please."

The conflicts around good versus evil among humans come from weighing the relative value of goodness of certain things, sometimes done errantly. A murderer enjoys killing. Pleasure is a good. Wanton killing is not. But the murderer in his twisted logic weighs the relative good of his pleasure over the good of another person's continuation of life. So we see that good still remains in some way, even though an evil act may occur. However, in the absence of an evil act, the good is seen that much more, and no evil is present. In other words, good is a force superior to evil, making evil derivative. Evil does not "exist" as a force so much is a manifestation of the misappropriation of good things for misguided ends. Evil then is the intent to promote an imbalanced sense of goodness for the sake of a preferred good.

How does this apply to God? We can say that God isn't evil, since evil is derivative, whereas God, by definition, is the source, original. That leaves goodness as being inherent in God's nature.

But what if God is neutral? What if good is created, but not necessarily part of what God is? The ramifications are critical. A neutral God would be neither good nor evil. In such a God, the two things would simply cease to exist. However, they would, once again be relegated to a place of preference.

But the way evil and good interact, in that evil is dependent upon good, implies a formal precedence of good over evil. That means goodness is not dependent, nor does it demonstrate in its nature that it could be. And in any definition of God, that which is foundational must be found within the nature of God. In platonic terms, God is the primary form from which all things are derivative. Therefore, since goodness is foundational, it must be by default part of the nature of God. Thus, God is good. I am more than happy to worship a God who is good.